RUSSIA, CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA IN THE SOUTH-AMERICAN DEFENSE MARKET by Borges Gama Neto, Ricardo
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations 
 e-ISSN 2238-6912 | ISSN 2238-6262| v.7, n.14, Jul./Dec. 2018 | p.158-182
RUSSIA, CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA IN THE 
SOUTH-AMERICAN DEFENSE MARKET
Ricardo Borges Gama Neto1
Introduction
The present article addresses two interconnected subjects. The first 
one is the relation between political ideology and the purchase of defense 
armaments, while the other is the opening of markets, which has occurred in 
South America in the last few years. The significant changes in the economy 
and politics of the subcontinent, which started in the end of the last century 
and continued until the first decades of the present one, brought about deep 
impacts, not only in the political environment, but also in what concerns the 
purchase of defense equipment. Political changes in key countries such as 
Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil and the growth of economies with 
the commodities’ boom have propelled the acquisition of defense material, at 
the same as opening markets for new sellers. Russia, as a descendent of the 
Soviet Union, has maintained its restricted buyers and, with the end of the 
Cold War, started to broaden its market by selling equipment that was vetoed 
by the North-American policy, such as the BVR Vympel R-77 missiles and the 
MANPAD Igla missiles type.
 Other important suppliers of defense material also have further en-
tered in the South-American market. Certainly, the most important ones are 
China and South Korea. The former uses its economic and political power of 
negotiation, acquired in the period of strong economic growth and enhance-
ment of trade relations, to enter in both Russian and other countries’ markets. 
The Chinese portfolio is vast and goes from cannons to training jets. Another 
important Chinese advantage is the capacity of its state banks of financing 
1 Professor at the department of Political Science in the Federal University of Pernambuco 
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Applied Computing to Political Science and Defense Studies. Gama Neto was also a research 
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such purchases. South Korea, for its turn, attempts to enter into the market 
by using aggressive commercial strategies and high-technology weapons’ sys-
tems, such as planes and missiles.
 This article utilizes specialized bibliography as well as resources from 
the statistical database of the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
Caribbean (CEPALSTAT)2 and from the arms trade register of the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)3, which contains official data 
of arms’ buyers and sellers worldwide. 
 The article is composed by this introduction, a main section divided 
in two chapters and the final remarks.
South America, Economic and Political Changes in the Begin-
ning of the 21st Century
The redemocratization process that took place in Latin America during 
the 1980s and 1990s occurred alongside a strong and persistent economic 
crisis, mainly characterized by high inflation rates and deep public indebt-
edness. The imbalances that Latin American economies have shown were 
mainly a consequence of the increase in the public debt in the last decade and 
of the aggressive expansion of the financial charges, derived from the increase 
in the international interest rates. In the 1970s, during and after the first 
petroleum crisis, when developed countries implemented macroeconomic 
policies with the aim of reducing the economic activity and, thus, controlling 
the increase of inflation, South American countries, in face of the necessity 
of legitimizing non-democratic political regimes, adopted a strategy of greater 
external indebtedness as a mechanism of compensating the lack of internal 
savings – necessary to enhance the development and growth projects.
 The answer to the fiscal and economic crisis through which the first 
democratic post-transition governments have passed, in the 1980s and 
1990s, were plans such as the Cruzado (Brazil), Inti (Peru) and Austral 
(Argentina). These actions were interposed by many through heterodox, 
structuralist measures, such as price-freezing, control of the exchange rate 
and the deepening of the imports’ substitution strategy. The aim was to 
achieve the macroeconomic stability without recession, thus providing the 
necessary political support to the implementation of fiscal reforms needed 
2 Available at http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp. Accessed 
June 8 2018.
3 Available at http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php). Accessed June 8 
2018.
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to stability. Such opportunity was lost in Argentina, Brazil and Peru. The 
initial honeymoon with the price-freezing was mistaken for success, and 
the fiscal consolidation was avoided. The programs, therefore, were lost 
(Cardoso 1989, 40. Our translation).
The failure of these heterodox politics was, in many cases, embodied 
in situations of hyperinflation (rates above 50% per month), such as in Ar-
gentina (1989), Brazil (1990), and Peru (1988/1990). Bolivia, for its turn, was 
the most extreme case, with an inflation rate of 12.000% in the year of 1985. 
The inflation average in 1989 for Latin America was superior to one hundred 
per cent.
 After the failure of heterodox economic control policies, a new set of 
reforms was implemented by the new Latin-American governments, being 
such set within a context of changes that had been occurring in the Welfare 
State’s framework of developed countries. These new reforms became gener-
ically known as the “Washington Consensus” and advocated: (i) a Rigid Fiscal 
Discipline; (ii) a Reduction in the Public Spending; (iii) Tax and Tributary 
Reforms; (iv) the Financial Liberalization; (v) a Market-determined Exchange 
Rate; (vi) the Liberalization of the Foreign Trade; (vii) the Liberalization of 
Foreign Direct Investment; (viii) the Privatization of state enterprises; (ix) the 
Deregulation of the economy and the Flexibility of relations; and (x) the Legal 
Security for Property Rights. In spite of being regarded by its opponents as a 
prescription of fixed reforms, the “Washington Consensus” was perceived by 
its defenders as a minimum minimorum. Each country should implement its 
adjustment solutions based in their realities.
 Bolivia was the first country to adopt macroeconomic control policies 
with strong liberal content. In 1985, the president Paz Estenssoro adopted 
a pro-market economic program, the so-called New Economic Policy (NEP), 
based in the ideas of the economist Jeffrey Sachs. The stabilization program 
laid its basis in restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, trade opening, pric-
es’ and exchange rates’ liberalization and flexibility in the labor market. The 
inflation rate fell from 23.000% to 10% a year. The country has presented a 
moderate recession in 1986, and, later on, had several years of low growth 
rates.
 Argentina, in 1991, during Carlos Menem’s government, adopted an 
adjustment model (Convertibility Plan) with strong similarities with the one 
implement in Bolivia, comprising, for instance, privatizations and a rigid fis-
cal policy. The Argentinian plan, nonetheless, had a fundamental difference: 
the establishment of a currency board (which obliged the government to back 
all issuance of local currency by the international reserves in dollars, in the 
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Central Bank), thus contrasting with the prescription of floating exchange 
rate. “The annual average inflation rates were reduced from 84%, in 1991, to 
3,9%, in 1994; during the same period, the GDP grew in an annual average 
rate of 7,7%, the consumption, in an annual rate of 8,6%, and the real invest-
ment in an annual rate of 22%” (Wise 2001, 173. Our translation).
 During the 1990s, other countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil 
and Peru had also adopted macroeconomic control plans based on pro-market 
measures, such as privatization, exchange liberation, tax increases and re-
strictive fiscal policies. In general terms, the result was the same: a significant 
cutback in the inflation rates and macroeconomic stabilization.
 With redemocratization, there was an intensification in economic in-
tegration processes, with the creation of customs unions. There has been the 
formation of MERCOSUR with Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay – as well as 
the posterior integration of Paraguay. The Andean Pact, comprising Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador Peru and Venezuela, was transformed into the Andean 
Community and established, in 1993, a Free-Trade Area (FTA). However, in 
defense matters, regional integration had no practical effect, in such a way 
that the relations between the armed forces of the region’s states remain 
centered in reduced joint military maneuvers, such as the operations COL-
BRA (Colombia/Brazil), VENBRA (Venezuela/Brazil) and “Cruzeiro do Sul” 
(CRUZEX).
 In the last decade of the 20th century, most countries that adopted 
economic stabilization programs through pro-market measures – with the ex-
ception of Chile – presented as a major visible collateral effect a low economic 
growth and an increase in inequality. In some cases, such as in Bolivia and 
Venezuela, the popular reactions against the measures of economic austerity 
have generated important popular uprisings. In this latter, the social manifes-
tations that occurred in the capital Caracas and which came to be known as 
Caracazo paved the way to an attempt of a coup d’état in 1992, commanded by 
colonel Hugo Chávez.
 If from the mid-1980s on there has been the election of governments 
with pro-market economic programs, from the end of the decade on, gov-
ernments strongly identified with left-wing and center-left ideals began to be 
elected. Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela in 1998, and then, 
successively: Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (2001), Luís Inácio Lula da Silva 
in Brazil (2002), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005), Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay 
(2005), Michele Bachelet in Chile (2006)4, Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007) 
4 In Chile, despite Michele Bachelet’s election, the policy of defense purchases had not been 
altered. The country remains giving preference to products produced in the West, particularly 
in the United States.
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and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2008).
 The South-American “turn to the Left” (or Pink Tide) occurred at the 
same time as the boom of the rise of commodity prices in the international 
market. From the beginning of the 2000s until approximately 2008, Bra-
zil and other countries of the subcontinent were strongly influenced by the 
abundance of resources brought about by the international rise in the prices 
of goods such as oil, copper, soy and iron ore. The growth of the Chinese 
economy, around 10% a year, was a major responsible for this phenomenon, 
alongside the low interest rates practiced by the developed countries.
Graphic 1: Growth of the South-American countries (2000–2010)
Source: CEPALSTAT
The growth in world trade and the increase in the commodities’ prices 
produced a strong rise in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of South Amer-
ica’s economies during the period between 2000 and 2008, with important 
variations, such as significant declines in the economic activities in Argen-
tina, Uruguay and Venezuela in 2002. Nevertheless, in general terms, the 
growth rates of the economies of the subcontinent were significant, being its 
average around 4%. The dynamism of the South-American economies had an 
important impact in the poverty rate, which has fallen from 44,5%, in 2000, 
to 33,0%, in 2008, and the per capita income grew from 3.886 dollars to 
4.597. “The existing number of poor and indigent in 2002, of 221 million and 
97 million, respectively, was reduced to 180 millions of poor and 71 millions 
of indigent” (Prado 2011, 16. Our translation).
 The conjunction of left-wing governments and the increase in the 
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importance of the emerging countries, especially China, envisioned by the 
growth of the South-South trade5, and the creation of forums as the ones 
known by the acronyms BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Af-
rica) and IBAS (India, Brazil and South Africa) had been politically materi-
alized in the formulation of more independent foreign policies – when not 
completely opposed to those advocated in Washington.
 Within the South-American subcontinent, the formation of the Un-
ion of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defense 
Council (SDC) are the main outcomes of the social, political and economic 
integration politics of the left-wing governments of that time. Nevertheless, 
one shall highlight that the creation of integration organisms dates back to 
the 1980s and 1990s, as it is the case of the Latin American Integration Asso-
ciation (ALADI), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the An-
dean Community. Even though the idea of forming an institution that could 
politically unite the South American countries in a forum for the resolution 
of political and security issues arose in Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s govern-
ment, in 20006, one of the main reasons for UNASUR’s and the SDC’s con-
5 “(...) from 1995 to 2004, the amount of money that has circulated due to the trade of goods 
in the South-South axis went from US$ 222 billions to US$ 562 billions. In 2007, this amount 
already represented 16,4% of the total US$ 14 trillions moved by worldwide trade – number 
which, in 2000, corresponded to 11,5%. The flow of foreign direct investments (FDIs) among 
these countries has shown an increase: in the same period, they went from US$ 14 billion to 
US$ 47 billion. The driving forces of such growth were the great emerging economies, more 
precisely, Brazil, Russia, India and China – group of countries well-known for the acronym 
BRICS”. Available at https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/pontes/news/comércio-sul-sul-no-
contexto-da-crise-econômica-oportunidades-e-desafios, accessed August 10 2017.
6 In 2000, during the 32nd General Assembly of the OAS, Ambassador Osmar Chofli 
highlighted the difficulties in the formation of a hemispherical defense policy. Nonetheless, 
the creation of a subcontinental policy was not regard as completely divergent from joint 
options with other international actors. “We believe, however, that the convergence around 
a single and comprehensive conception of security, fully applicable to the three continental 
masses of the Americas to the Caribbean, is difficult. South America, continent in which 
Brazil is geographically inserted, possesses its own strategic identity. Far from the main global 
tension axes, free from nuclear weapons and with low indexes of military expenditures, the 
South American countries conduct a well-succeeded process of regional integration, fostered 
by MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. The geographical circumstance of a same 
immediate neighborhood leads us to work a common agenda of subjects, opportunities and 
concerns. Democracy, regional integration, our growing community of values contribute to the 
consolidation of South America as a zone of peace, where cooperation and the joint pursue 
of stability and prosperity led to the definitive overcoming of past rivalries, thus creating an 
irreversible net of interests and opportunities. Together with all the hemisphere, we uphold 
convergent positions in what concerns the great issues of the international agenda, such as, 
among others, the promotion of defense and democracy, the respect for the human rights, 
the protection of the environment, the overcoming of poverty, the combat against organized 
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stitution was a strategy of some governments, especially Brazil, Argentina, 
Bolivia and Venezuela, of institutionally restricting the spaces of action of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) as an organism of conflicts’ resolu-
tion. Through UNASUR, the South-American problems would no longer be 
treated as inter-American ones. 
From Brazil’s point of view, the creation of the South American Defense 
Council, in December 2008, is connected to the objective of strengthening 
cooperation in defense and security matters, and also refers to the inten-
tion of establishing a counterpoint to United States’ interference in South 
America, more precisely, in the Andean region. (…). The countries in the 
region did not have a history of cooperation in defense and security – a 
great part of it was due to the different perspectives about each other – 
and would subordinate the discussion of these questions to their relation 
with the United States or to the regimes and institutions created under this 
country’s hegemony, such as the Organization of American States (OAS). 
In the formation of the South American Defense Council lays the idea of 
using Unasur’s own institutionality to solve controversies and tensions in 
the region, as it has occurred in Bolivia’s institutional crisis, in 2008, in 
the reaction to the utilization of military bases of the United States in Co-
lombia, in the tension between Colombia and Venezuela, in 2010, e in the 
deposition of Paraguay’s president, Fernando Lugo, in July 2011 (Vigevani 
and Ramanzini Junior 2014, 538. Our translation).
Political Changes and the South American Defense Market
As we have already stated, from the beginning of the 20th century’s first 
decade on, Latin America countries witnessed a deep renovation in national 
political leaderships. Among such leaderships, the most controversial and most 
charismatic one was certainly president Hugo Chávez. Being a lieutenant col-
onel of the Venezuelan army, Chávez had emerged in the Latin American sce-
nario as the leader of an attempted military coup against Carlos Andrés Perez’s 
government, in 1992. Due to the failed attempt of carrying out a military coup, 
Chávez was arrested and, later on, granted amnesty by President Rafael Cal-
crime and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Regional and sub regional 
initiatives should not be interpreted as obstacles to the construction of a hemispherical security 
perspective. On the contrary, they constitute important reinforcement and complementarity 
steps for hemispherical-range settles, since they facilitate, through “building blocks”, the 
identification and the inclusion, in the general context, of those aspects that may have a 
common applicability” (Our translation) Available at http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/
speeches/speech_brasil.htm. Accessed in August 10 2017.
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deira. In 1997, Chávez created a political party, the Fifth Republic Movement, 
which, one year later, elected eight out of twenty-three of the states’ governors, 
thus obtaining 1/3 of the total chairs in the national parliament. Following its 
trajectory as a politician, Chávez was elected president in 1998, with 56% of the 
votes, by a coalition of left-wing parties. Benefiting from his enormous popular-
ity, as soon as he took over, the president convened a referendum for a new Con-
stituent Assembly, which has obtained great approval. The coalition of support 
for the Venezuelan president managed to elect 120 of the 131 constituents. The 
new Constitution was approved in a popular referendum in December 1999 
and has produced deep changes in the Venezuelan political game rules: it has 
amplified the powers of the executive, allowed a larger intervention of the state 
in the economy, extinguished the Senate and convened new presidential elec-
tions in 2000, when Chávez was once again reelected.
 In the beginning of the 2000s, Venezuelan foreign policy had as its aim 
turning Hugo Chávez into Latin America’s most important political leader. Its 
action strategy had, at least, three axes: a vigorous speech praising Latin Ameri-
can unity against the ‘North-American imperialist threat’; a declared support to 
left-wing politicians across the region in electoral periods; and financial aid to 
allied governments and political organizations, including guerillas.
 In April 11 of 2002, Hugo Chávez suffered a coup attempt. Rebel mil-
itary have deterred the president, extinguished the Constitution, dissolved the 
National Assembly and the Court of Justice and abrogated many decrees and 
laws. The businessman Fernando Francisco Carmona Estanga took over the 
presidency. The coup lasted less than 48 hours. The opposition of the Venezue-
lan population, of military factions, especially from the National Guard, and of 
the Catholic Church led the coup to fail. Across the subcontinent, the region’s 
governments have denounced the interruption of democratic normality in the 
country. Notwithstanding, the United States government’s behavior – which 
has not only not condemned the coup, but also provided an implicit recognition 
to the illegal government –displeased the great majority of the countries in re-
gion and deeply shook the already complicated relationship between Venezuela 
and the U.S.
 Relations between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) and the Venezuelan government were also a factor that produced in-
tense instability in the subcontinent’s northern region. The FARC is a guerrilla 
group, currently in disarmament process, of Marxist-Leninist ideology, which 
had emerged in the mid-1960s and which had fought against all the Colombi-
an governments aiming at establishing a socialist regime in the country7. The 
7 In 2004, as a result of Hugo Chávez’s consolidation as Latin American left-wing leader 
and of his support to the guerrilla fight in Colombia, FARC also adopted Bolivarianism as 
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Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez stressed that the Latin American countries 
should not classify the Colombian guerilla as terrorist, but rather as a “bellig-
erent opposition force” (the FARC is considered as a terrorist organization by 
the governments of the United States and Canada, as well as by the European 
Union).
 The unfriendly relations between the U.S. and Venezuela worsened 
when, in the beginning of 2006, the United States prevented Hugo Chávez’s 
government from having access to more recent military technology. First, by 
preventing the Venezuelan Air Forces from reforming, through a Mid-Life 
Update (MLU)-modernization type, its old attack aircraft F-16 Fighter Falcon 
(models A and B Block 15, which were already obsolete when received in 
1983). And after, by forbidding armament manufacturers to export any sort 
of equipment with North-American technology and using the Arms Export 
Control Act’s8 legislation. Both Brazil and Spain were prohibited to sell training 
(A-29/Super Tucano) and transport (C-295) planes9 (Villa and Viggiano 2012).
 This was the political background in which Venezuela started a strong 
process of acquisition of non-western defense material. Venezuela’s policy of 
increasing its military capabilities began with the purchase, in significant quan-
tities, of Russian belligerent material, first with the acquisition of 24 fighter 
aircrafts Sukhoi – 30MK2 Flanker, 100.000 assault rifles AK-103 (and manu-
facturing license) and 53 helicopters from Vertolyoty Rossii, totaling an estimated 
amount of US$ 3 billion (Oliker et al. 2009).
U.S. and regional officials fear that Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez is 
seeking to foment revolution throughout Latin America and that he will 
its political ideology. Ricardo González, member of FARC’s military staff, affirmed that 
“we are also constructing the Bolivarian Movement for the New Colombia, which is also a 
clandestine movement strongly rooted in the students’ and laborers’ sectors, in the peripheral 
neighborhoods of the big cities, in the university sectors and in the intelligentsia. What occurs 
is an eminently clandestine work, and people cannot reveal to others what they are doing from 
the point of view of their ideological, political and organizational work”. Available at http://
www.rebelion.org/hemeroteca/plancolombia/040407urbano.htm. Accessed June 8 2018.  
8 Available at https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/aeca.html.
9 Villa and Viggiano (2012, 33) stress that: “In 2006, the US State Department imposed an 
embargo that prevents Venezuela from importing goods and services of Defense nature. In 
the same year, Venezuela was certified by the US government, under Section 40A of the Arms 
and Control Act (AECA), as a country “not fully cooperative” in the fight against terrorism. 
The AECA certification was renewed in 2007 and 2008. By this mechanism, Venezuela is not 
allowed any assistance, sale or financing by the US military. In practice, the US embargo on 
arms sales has led representatives of the Venezuelan armed forces to pressure the executive to 
look for alternative import markets. Several arms-producing countries are alert to Venezuela’s 
air force plans to buy other types of aircraft attached to the Sukhois purchased from Russia”.
Ricardo Borges Gama Neto
167
use his new Russian- made arsenal for this purpose. Chavez’s first target 
could be Colombia, where Venezuelan-made AK-47s might end up in the 
hands of the Colombian rebel groups such as the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (Oliker et al. 2009, 
182).
 The Venezuelan armament purchase process had three objectives, be-
ing the first one reinforcing its foreign policy by demonstrating full indepen-
dence of the United States; the second one, enlarging and consolidating the 
internal support of the military – essential for preventing new attempts of a 
coup d’état; and the third one, modernizing the armed forces.
 The acquisition of a large amount of defense material has brought 
about the unquietness of many political leaderships in South America10. By that 
time, the quality of the Latin American countries’ military equipment, especial-
ly from the Amazon region, was still very inferior to the countries’ necessities. 
In the end of the 1990s and in the beginning of the 21st century, the majority 
of the armed forces found themselves with their military capacity very reduced. 
Bolivia, for instance, barely had military aviation – which was reduced to few 
and obsolete jets Lockheed T-33 Shooting Star) –, and its ground forces were 
completely unequipped and untrained. Ecuador’s air forces, which in the 1990s 
were capable of competing with the Peruvian one, were almost on the verge of 
collapsing, being reduced to over a dozen of Israeli fighters KFIR C2 and TC2. 
Its army, despite well-trained, had few hundreds of AMX 13 light tanks, with 
low availability. The Peruvian Air Force has probably been the subcontinent’s 
second most powerful one, standing only behind the Chilean one (which had 
bought dozens of F-16 fighters in 20020. Formally, the Peruvian Air Force had 
a good combat capacity with its MIG-29S Fulcrum and Mirage 2000 C/D, how-
ever, it did not have financial means to keep all of its fighters in operation con-
10 One example of this is an interview made by Brazil’s ex-president, José Sarney: “South 
America is the most pacific of the continents. It has been more than one hundred years since 
we do not have a war. Democracy is consolidated across the whole region. We never allowed 
the occurrence of an arms race. At the slightest sign, we all react. (…) Thus, Chávez’s plan of 
spending US$ 60 billions in weapons, transforming Venezuela into a military power, is a threat 
to the continent. (…) What is this for? For facing the United States? Well, to the superpower, 
this does not mean anything, but, for us, it is a movement that makes us tremble. One of 
each: either Brazil enters in the arms race in order to ensure its defense, withdrawing the 
scarce resources of its budget that has been serving to our social programs, or, then, in order 
to survive, the country finds itself coerced into taking cover in NATO’s umbrella, tragically 
bringing back Menen’s thesis as the only way of defending ourselves. Menem was against 
Brazil; now we are all uniting to defend ourselves from the “new military power” that will 
dominate South America” (Folha de São Paulo, 14/07/2006).
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ditions11. The army, for its turn, had as its main combating vehicle the old soviet 
T-54 and T-55 tanks. With the exception of Colombia – where the government 
used to receive significant material and financial support from the U.S. due to 
its fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –, all of the other 
Amazon regions’ military institutions presented signs of true operational decay.
 The last cycle of military equipment’s restoration in the South Amer-
ican continent occurred in the first years of the 1970s and lasted until the be-
ginning of the following decade. The subcontinent’s countries acquired equip-
ment mostly from its traditional suppliers, namely, the United States, England, 
Germany and France, while Peru preferred Soviet Union’s weaponry rather 
than the North-American one. Israel, for its turn, has become an important 
defense equipment’s supplier: fighters (IAI Dagger and IAI ARAVA), compact 
submachine-guns (UZI), non-guided bombs, diverse electronic systems, air-to-
air (Shifir and Python) and anti-ship (Gabriel) missiles and missile boats (Sa’ar 
class).
 The purchase of military equipment is a political decision. It is not 
possible to develop a general theory about what reasons motivate a country to 
acquire more apparatuses. In general terms, the motivations may be classified 
as internal (connected, for instance, to the regime’s protection, the pursue of 
the military’s political support or even subsidies to the modernization of the 
defense industry) and/or external (for example, the expansion of the capacity 
to defend itself from an offensive or to carry one out and the increase in the 
regional or hemispheric political influence). In the case of South America, the 
purchase of fighters, tanks, machine guns and ships was inserted with the Cold 
War’s political logic. In the subcontinent, the first country to ever buy Soviet/
Russian military equipment was Peru. In 1968, general Juan Velasco Alvarado 
deposed the then president Fernando Bellaúnde Terry and implemented a na-
tionalist administration, with left-wing reformist policies. The political choices 
of the new military government, such as the nationalization of oil companies 
(and the posterior creation of the state enterprise PetroPeru) and the increase 
in the Peruvian territorial sea to 200 maritime miles, automatically put it in 
collision with Washington. The social and economic policies of the Peruvian 
military regime and the tensioning in its relations with the U.S. led the Soviet 
Union to support the Velasco government.
The Velasco regime’s anti-imperialist rhetoric and its policies of economic 
nationalism drew praise and interest from Moscow. Soviet analysts viewed 
these policies as politically encouraging and capable of shifting the balance 
11 Available at  http://larepublica.pe/amp/28-03-2005/los-aviones-de-fujimori-no-servian-
para-atacar-ecuador. Accessed in June 8 2018.
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of power in favor of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gained signif-
icant goodwill after a devastating earthquake in the Callejón de Huaylas 
near Chimbote in northern Peru, killed seventy thousand people and left 
500,000 homeless on 31 May 1970. Soviet medical teams gave valuable 
assistance to the injured and loaned Mi-8 helicopters to be used in relief 
efforts (Masterson 1991, 258). 
 In an attempt to become more independent from Washington and re-
turn the solidarity of the Iron Curtain countries’ governments, the Peruvian 
military government started to purchase Soviet military material. In 1973, Peru 
bought 36 Sukhoi-22 Fitter fighters (the country has already been operating 
French Mirage 5 fighters since 1968), 16 transport planes Antonov AN-26, 350 
tanks T-54 and T-55, anti-aircraft missiles SAM-3 and SAM-7, rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers RPG-7 and helicopters MI-6 and MI-8, among other equip-
ment. Nonetheless, the purchase of military apparatuses was restricted to the 
army and the air force; the navy refused the offer of Russian ships and sub-
marines, preferring Italian ships (Lupo-class frigate) and German submarines 
(IKL-209). From 1973 to 1985, the military acquisitions from the USSR costed 
more than 1,6 billion dollars (Clayton 1999).
 In the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)’s da-
tabase, it is possible to identify few purchases of Soviet military material during 
the 1980s, and only by two buyers, Peru and Guyana (helicopters, missiles and 
aircrafts)12. In spite of the economic crisis in the country, the Peruvian govern-
ments, in light of the necessity of fighting guerillas, continued to buy military 
equipment, especially for the air force. The expansion of the defense market for 
Russian products occurred only after the end of the Cold War. Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela began to acquire equipment as 
diverse as training and maneuvers fighters Sukhoi-29 AR, MANPAD missiles 
of Igla type and even attack helicopters.
 The opening of the South American market after the end of the Cold 
War was an important fact to the Russian military industry, which suffered 
from a severe crisis in light of the economic difficulties derived from the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact, in 1991 (Oliker et al. 2009). 
For the countries of the South American subcontinent, the purchase of Russian 
material, besides being cheaper than the Western one, also allowed them to 
avoid the restrictions to the acquisition of more technologically sophisticated 
defense material, as it is the case of the Igla/SA-18 surface-to-air missile and the 
12 In 1983, Argentina bought SAM-7 missiles from Bulgaria and Peru. In 1970, Guyana 
declared itself as a cooperative republic with strong socialist character. Following this, the 
country began to purchase transport helicopters 120mm mortars.
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Beyond Vision Range (BVR) R-77 air-to-air missile. In an attempt to avoid losses 
in the South American market share, Bill Clinton’s administration abrogated, 
in 1997, the Presidential Directive 13 (PD-13), instituted by president Jimmy 
Carter and which almost prohibited the transferring of high-technology arma-
ment13.
Until 1995, U.S. defense contractors paid little attention to Latin America. 
In a good year, Latin American generals bought no more than $1 billion 
worth of weapons, small change as long as aerospace giants had hundreds 
of billions of dollars in aircraft sales to the Pentagon and the Middle East. 
But with the Defense Department shrinking weapons buys and Arab coun-
tries no longer placing large orders, the billion-dollar Latin American mar-
ket suddenly looked attractive.
(...)
Getting the Pentagon to lobby for lifting the restraints was easy. Then De-
fense Secretary William Perry had met with Latin American generals, and 
was convinced their days of overthrowing governments was over. If the 
Pentagon was lucky, it might even be able to unload some of its older mod-
el F-16s south of the border and use the proceeds to restock its air wings 
with newer versions of the Falcon. Industry executives and Perry aides be-
gan publicly plugging the idea of lifting the restrictions: the countries of 
Latin America save for Cuba were now democratic, their economies were 
rebounding, and the jets their air forces flew in many cases were 1950s 
vintage, went the spiel. “We treat the Latins like children when we say they 
can’t have new planes,” says Joel Johnson, the Aerospace Industries As-
sociation’s international vice president, implying that to have fully adult 
relations with other countries requires supplying them with sophisticated 
armaments14.
 The economic crisis and the expense restriction policies that reached 
South America during the 1990s translated themselves into a small reduction 
in the defense expenses, which fell from 2,2% to 1,8% in 1999, in GDP’s per-
centage15. The reduced decline in the South American countries’ expense also 
occurred in global terms, however, for another reason: the end of the Cold War. 
From the fall of the Berlin Wall on and during all decade, the global military 
13 Available at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd13.pdf. Accessed in June 8 2018.
14 Available at http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/04/07/time/arms.html. Accessed 
in June 8 2018.
15 Often, there was an evident wish of purchasing Russian material, but the financial incapacity 
made the negotiations unfeasible. Even though there has been information about a Brazilian 
interest in acquiring attack helicopters from Russia in the mid-1990s, in was only in 2010 that 
such purchase happened (Glinki and Nutenko 1998 apud Zubelzú de Bacigalupo 2000).
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expense decayed from 3,2% to 2,1% of the GDP.
Graphic 2: Defense Expenditures by Gross Domestic Product
Source: SIPRI
The increase in the economic growth in the 2000s came along with 
a reconstitution and a modernization of South American countries’ military 
arsenals, particularly Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezue-
la. Among these cases, two may be highlighted due to their strong political 
content, especially in what concerns the North-American foreign policy and 
South America: Colombia, which has received North-American investments 
through the Plan Colombia (provision of U.S.’ military aid with the double 
goal of reducing the production of cocaine and helping the Colombian armed 
forces to fight against left-wing guerilla groups) and Venezuela, with its policy 
of purchasing Russian armament. The defense-related expenditures in the 
subcontinent, which were of approximately US$ 24 billion in the beginning 
of the century, increased up to US$ 32 billion in 200716, reaching US$ 57 bil-
lion in 2015 (SIPRI 2016). However, if one observes this increase in GDP per-
centage terms, it becomes possible to notice that the expenses with defense 
fell from 3,5 (1985) to 1,9 (2002) and 1,7 (2014).
16 Data from “Nueva Maioria – Balance Militar de América del Sul (2004)”: http://www.
nuevamayoria.com/ES/BIBLIOTECA/?file=resenas/041116.html. Accessed June 8 2018.
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Graphic 3: Defense Expenditures by Per Capita Income
Source: SIPRI
If the defense expenses, in GDP terms, had no increase, in per capita 
terms, it raised from U$ 3.674,00 (1985) to U$ 3.800,00 (2002), reaching U$ 
6.251 (2015 data). One may highlight the increase in the per capita expenses of 
Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador and Colombia. The South America’s countries low 
expense in GDP terms, when compared to the rise in per capita terms, shows 
that part of the strong economic growth of the period was transformed into 
defense expenses.
 The most impressing case in the period regarding the increase in de-
fense expenses was the one of Ecuador, whose spending went from 1,5% to 
reach its maximum of 3,1% of the GDP between 2009 and 2011, falling 0,03% 
until 2014. In per capita terms, the increase reached 240%.
Within the framework of the South American Defense Council, the Un-
ion of South American Nations (UNASUR) publicized the so-called South 
American Defense Expenditure Registry. The document has revealed that 
Ecuador is the region’s country that directs the largest percentage of its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to military expenses: 2,74% in 2010. Co-
lombia directs 1,89%, while for Brazil this amount is of 0,77%. During the 
meeting held yesterday in Quito, UNASUR identified four main objects of 
the defense expenditure. The major part of the investments in the area fo-
cuses on personnel, followed by resources to operations and maintenance. 
In third place, there are the investments in weaponry and infrastructure 
and, finally, investigation (Our translation)17.
17 Available at http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/seguridad/ecuador-destina-mayor-
porcentaje-del.html. Accessed June 8 2018.
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According to the Russian state company of defense equipment’s’ ex-
ports, Rosoboronexport18, the country exported, between 2001 and 2017, more 
than US$ 10 billion in military apparatuses to Latin America’s countries19. De-
spite the apparently high volume, it represents only 4,6% of the total number 
of Russian weapons exported across the world, whose main market is the Asian 
one, which accounts for 70% (2000 – 2016). Venezuela is by far the major 
Latin American purchaser, representing 80% of Russia’s sales (Connolly and 
Sendstad 2017). Besides the Bolivarian regime, other countries that, since the 
beginning of the century, have acquired Russian equipment are: Argentina, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay20. Chile does not possess 
any defense equipment manufactured in Russia.
Venezuela and Peru are the countries with the largest number of Rus-
sian military equipment in their inventories; the other countries of the subcon-
tinent have acquired more North-American and European equipment, espe-
cially Chile. The variety of Russia’s weapons sold in South America comprises, 
mainly, rifles (AK), many calibers cannons, transport and attack helicopters (Mi-
8MT/Mi-17/Mi-35), anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles and transport vehicles 
(BMP and BTR). There is no data in SIPRI regarding Russian manufactured 
ships and submarines acquired by South America’s navies. Researches in the 
Venezuelan and Peruvian armed forces’ websites also do not indicate the incor-
poration of Russian warships. Interestingly, the main naval equipment of both 
forces are very similar: Italian frigates, German submarines and other smaller 
ships from diverse countries. In 2002, Venezuela established an agreement 
with Cuba for the construction of coastal patrol boats (Damen Stan 2600) in the 
country, through the state-owned shipyard Ucocar21, and acquired eight landing 
ships (Damen Stan Lander 5612), built in Vietnam by the Ha Long Shipbuilding 
shipyard. Both are models of Dutch design.
   Russian-manufactured planes fly under the insignias of many of 
the subcontinent’s air forces. Nevertheless, Russian aircrafts for fighter and 
bombing purposes are only used by Peru and Venezuela. The situations in 
which each country has purchased this material were very distinct, however. The 
Sukhoi -22 Fitter were incorporated into the Peruvian Air Force in the 1970s, 
as part of a broader agreement for the modernization of the armed forces. 
In 1996/8, the Peruvians acquired, in a purchase from Belarus, 18 fighters 
MiG-29 Fulcrum, without previously consulting Russia. The acquisition has 
18 Available at http://roe.ru/eng/. Acessed June 8 2018.
19 Available at https://br.rbth.com/defesa/2017/04/24/america-latina-comprou-mais-de-us-
10-bilhoes-em-armamentos-russos_749491. Accessed June 8 2018.
20 In the mid 1990s, Uruguay bought from Czechoslovakia transport vehicles BMP-1.
21 Available at http://www.ucocar.gob.ve/ucocar_jo/.
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created some tensions between diplomatic and military authorities in Moscow 
and Lima, given Mikoyan-Gurevich (MIG)’s refusal in offering the plane’s 
maintenance – issue that has been overcome by Peru’s purchase of three more 
MIG-29, directly from the manufacturer22.
In the case of Venezuela, already mentioned before, the acquisition 
occurred as a response of Hugo Chávez government to the U.S.’ prohibition 
on the access to technology for the modernization and purchase of military 
equipment. However, there has always been a strong questioning about the op-
erational availability of the Sukhoi-30 Flanker MK223 in the Bolivarian Military 
Aviation.
(…) after 8 years [2014] of its incorporation, it is not very common to see the 
Su-30 fulfilling their task of intercepting aircrafts raiding the Venezuelan 
airspace, as in the incidents with the North-American P-3 Orion. In these 
cases, and also in the interception of narco traffic-related flights, the em-
ployed aircrafts have been the already old F-16A/B Block 15 OCU.
After a few years since the incorporation of the Su-30 MK2, all of the fleet 
had to stay on the ground for three months due to the lack of pieces for its 
operation. In this particular case, these were pieces that were not manufac-
tured in Venezuela and which the Russian supplier had taken long to send 
to Venezuela.
In the branches of the Venezuelan Military Aviation, there is a lot of dis-
satisfaction with the customer service of Russian enterprises, especially for 
being a non-reliable supply and for having an inadequate technical support. 
This issue has been overshadowing the much appreciated qualities of the 
Su-30 MK2 in Venezuela, forcing the Venezuelan Military Aviation to de-
pend on the F-16 as first line fighters, despite the embargo problems that 
reduce the F-16 fleet and hamper its modernization.
The Flankers’s incorporation in Venezuela has created many expectations 
for the Venezuelan Military Aviation, however, the Russian post-sale ser-
vice has been bringing about many problems and, alongside a very low 
average of monthly flight hours, the Flanker has converted itself into an 
unreliable system for Venezuela, thus creating a gap in the Venezuelan air 
capacities24 (Our translation).
In spite of the problems that may have occurred during the incorpora-
tion process of the Russian aircraft fighters, the Venezuelan government actual-
ly had a reduced maneuver space for the purchase of combat aircraft from other 
manufacturers, as in the case of the European deltas (Eurofighter Typhoon or 
22 Available at http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/peru/mig.htm. Accessed June 8 2018.
23 At Cruzex 2013, the Bolivarian Military Aviation was represented by four F-16 jets.
24 Available at http://www.planobrazil.com/a-reduzida-operatividade-dos-sukhois-
venezuelanos/. Acessed June 8 2018.
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JAS Gripen) or even Chinese fighters (J-10 or J-17). In 2015, President Nicolás 
Maduro announced the order of more 12 Sukhoi-30 MK2 in order to replace 
two models that were lost in accidents and to totally abandon the use of the F-16 
Fighting Falcons. The cost of the new jets was estimated to be around half billion 
dollars.
 The concentration of Russian sales to Venezuela and the increase in the 
competition with military equipment from other countries has been obliging 
Russia to introduce a more aggressive exporting policy of armaments for Lat-
in American, especially in the countries that ought to modernize their armed 
forces and which are big commodities’ exporters, particularly Peru, Ecuador and 
Argentina. Another important fact is the attempt to enter in modernizing pro-
grams of military equipment from the Soviet era, such as in the case of the 
Peruvian T-55.
 China has been the major commercial partner of South America since 
the beginning of the 21st century. The Chinese economic dynamism, which, 
throughout many years, had translated itself into growth rates around 10%, 
had a reflection in the rise of trade relations with the subcontinent’s countries. 
From 2000 to 2015, the commercial expansion increased 22 times. According 
to Holland and Barbi (2010), the relations between China and Latin America 
occur in four ways: (i) as an importer of natural resources and energy; (ii) as 
an exporter of industrialized products, manufactured in Chinese territory; (iii) 
through the formation of joint-ventures25 partnerships; and (iv) as a loan provid-
er26.
 In 2015, China became the third global weapons’ exporter, standing 
only behind the United States and Russia. The Chinese weapons’ largest buyers 
are Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, representing almost 70% of the total 
amount (Fleurant et al. 2017). Despite the increase in the Chinese weaponry’s 
importance in the global trade, a question arises: what is the technologic devel-
opment level of the Chinese armament? Apparently, China has developed a le-
25 “In 2008, the state company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) established a joint venture with 
China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) in order to develop the fourth bloc of the Junin field, 
in the Orinoco river. Within this project’s framework, the Chinese corporation will have a share 
of 40% in the participation. PetroChina, for its turn, established with the PDVSA a joint venture 
to build and operate an oil refinery, with a capacity of 400 thousand barrels per day (B/D) 
withdrawn from the Junin 4 well. PetroChina has a share of 60% in this project” (Holland and 
Barbi 2010, 22. Our translation).
26 In May 2009, “(...) the China Development Bank (CDB) loaned US$ 10 billion to Petrobras. 
The agreement postulates that the company shall export 150 thousand barrels of petroleum per 
day to Unipec Asia, Sinopec’s subsidiary, China’s state company of petroleum, from 2009 on, 
and 200 thousand barrels per day between 2010 and 2019” (Holland and Barbi 2010, 22. Our 
translation).
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gal strategy of importing high-technology weapons to posteriorly introduce in-
novations with the aid of industrial espionage, as it is the case of the Nanchang 
Q/A-5 Fantan (a modernized version of of the Mig-19 Farmer/Shenyang J-6, 
with an intelligent retrofit of the air entrance and of the radar’s radome) and the 
Chengdu F-7 (Chinese replica of the Mig-21 Fishbed, which was equipped with 
Western avionics – radar Type 226 Skyranger from the English BAE System).
 From the 1950s on, China began to import defense material from the 
Soviet Union and to assemble – with or without license – many equipment, 
from the AK-47 riffle (Norinco Type 56), to tanks as the T-54 (Norinco Type 59) 
and T-62 (Norinco Type 69) and to many types of aircraft. In almost all of the 
cases, the Chinese began to construct the equipment under license in order to 
posteriorly introduce modifications, until managing to build apparatuses with 
the maximum number of components developed in the country. With the eco-
nomic opening of the 1980s and the 1990s and the boom of the Chinese eco-
nomic growth in the 2000s, China began to receive and invest more in defense 
technologic research, however, without abandoning its traditional strategy. As 
shown by the cases of the Sukhoi-27SK – Shenyang F/J-1127.
 If, on the one hand, the Chinese have demonstrated a high industrial 
espionage capacity (as, for instance, in the strong design similarities between 
the fighter F-22 Raptor and the Chinese -20, as well as between U.S.’ drone 
MQ-9 Reaper and China’s CASC CH-5 Caihong), on the other, there is a deep 
questioning about the current quality of Chinese equipment’s production28. The 
IAI Lavi/Chengdu J-10 case, the licensed construction of the French helicopter 
AS365 Dauphin (Harbin Z-9), the extensive utilization of Russian engines (Sat-
urn AL-31) in the main combat aircrafts, the utilization of Ukrainian engines in 
the main Chinese tank (MTB2000) and in advanced training aircrafts (K08 and 
L-15), as well as the employment of Western technology in the missiles’ guiding 
systems and other sensitive technologies29 show that the country still is not ca-
pable of producing high-quality military equipment without any sort of external 
aid30.
27 Available at https://sputniknews.com/russia/2008022199765686/. Accessed June 8 2018.
28 Available at https://www.epochtimes.com.br/armas-da-china-real-guerra/#.
WcmS60zOqu4. Accssed June 8 2018.
29 Available at https://www.newsweek.com/chinese-military-power-us-might-643022. 
Accessed June 8 2018.
30 When analyzing Chinese armed forces’ difficulties in coping with the XXI century’s 
transformations, Li Xiang (2013, 26-27) affirms that “it is urgent to enhance the independent 
innovation of defense-related science, technology, and industry. Scientific and technological 
progress is essential for implementing key information technologies, consequently improving 
the information level of weapons and equipment. However, there are still many problems to 
be solved in the national defense science and technology industry of China. For example, the 
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(…) China has made considerable headway in modernizing its defense sci-
ence, technology, and industrial capabilities and has achieved impressive 
results in a number of areas since the turn of this century. Generation-
al improvements have been made in the development and production of 
a growing array of weapons, from warships to combat aircraft, although 
the Chinese defense industry overall still lags technologically one or two 
generations behind the global frontier. Sharply increased funding for re-
search and development, sustained high-level leadership attention, and the 
absorption of advanced foreign technologies, especially from Russia, are 
some of the major reasons for these gains” (Chase et al. 2015, 126).  
      
Argentina31, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Venezuela possess mili-
tary equipment of Chinese production in their arsenals. The first weapons were 
bought in the beginning of the of the 1990s by the Bolivian, Ecuadorian and 
Peruvian government. The former two acquired mainly cannons and howit-
zers (D20 and M30), portable missiles MANPADS (HN-5A) type and anti-tank 
missiles (Red Arrow-8). The latter one, for its turn, bought Harbin Y-12 light 
transport aircraft. There is a gap of almost 10 years in the purchase of Chinese 
weaponry by the countries of the subcontinent. From the 2000s on, there was 
a significant increase in the purchase of defense material from China, either 
in terms of volume and embarked technology. Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela started to acquire many types of equipment that outstand for its em-
ployed technology rates, such as infantry fighting vehicles (VN16 and 18), di-
verse types of radars (JY-1, JY-11, YLC-18, YLC-2), helicopters (H-425 and Z-9), 
advanced training aircraft (Honddu JL-8/K-8 Karakorum32 – an aircraft very 
similar to the English jet BAE Hawk) and the short range air-to-air PL5E missile.
The purchase of Chinese military material seems to occur mainly due to 
their prices, given that they are cheaper than the Western and Russian ones, and 
to political reasons, since China does not establish any restriction to a country 
structure is irrational; enterprise reform has not been deep enough; competition and capacity 
still need to improve; and there is also a lack of strategic planning and institutional building of 
integrated military-civilian development. These prominent contradictions should be solved in 
the second decade of this century”.
31 Besides acquiring Chinese military equipment, Argentina has acquired a license to 
manufacture the CZ-11 light utility helicopters, a reproduction of the European AS 350B Ecureil.
32 Bolivia had established an agreement with the Czech jets’ manufacturer Aero Vodochody 
in order to purchase L-159 ALCA advanced training jets. However, the North-American 
government vetoed the sale in light of the intense utilization of U.S.’ technology in the Czech 
jet, as, for instance, the Honeywell F124-GA-100 engine. Due to this, Evo Morales’ government 
chose the K-8 jet, which was the one that has been bought by Venezuela. Available at https://
moraisvinna.blogspot.com/2009/08/chance-para-os-l-15-ou-yak-130-eua-nao.html. Accessed 
June 8 2018.
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because of its political regime. An important factor for the rise in the sales has 
been the offer of financing through state banks, especially the China Export 
and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) and the Export-Import Bank of 
China (China Exim Bank)33 to the purchase of this material34. Another element 
that shall be highlighted is the fact that the main Chinese weapons’ buyers in 
South America are all countries with strong left-wing governments. In such 
cases, besides the Chinese financing, one may notice that probably some gov-
ernments have been attempting to escape from the dependence of the Russian 
armament, especially Venezuela.
In a similar way to the Russian defense equipment, it was not possible 
to find any information regarding South American countries’ purchase of ships 
or submarines manufactured in China or which use Chinese technology. Al-
though countries as Venezuela and Uruguay have shown interest in acquiring 
new offshore patrol vessels derived from the P-18N model, a likely reason for 
a disinterest may be the scarce contact between South America’s navies and 
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as the one that occurred in 2013, 
when a small Chinese flotilla composed by the Lanzhou (Type 052C) destroyer 
and the Liuzhou (Type 054A) frigate participated in maneuvers with the Chil-
ean army and the Brazilian navy. Furthermore, in spite of an excellent stealth 
design, the new Chinese ships intensely employ Russian technology.
In what concerns training ships and other types of warships, the first of 
these visits was made by the Chilean navy’s training ship, Esmeralda, 
which reached the port of Shanghai in 1972. Until 2009, Esmeralda had 
visited Chinese ports in 10 different occasions. As a reciprocity, China’s 
first naval flotilla visited Latin America in April 1997. It included destroyers 
(missiles) Harbin and Zhuhai and the logistic ship Nancang. The flotilla 
docked in Mexico, Peru and Chile, as well as in the North-American base 
of Pearl Harbor. The most recent visit of this kind, in the moment that this 
article was being redacted, occurred in 2009 – a naval flotilla from China, 
which included the destroyer Shijazhuang and the feeder ship Hongzehu 
docked in Valparaíso, Chile; Callao, Peru; and Guayaquil, Ecuador. In spite 
of having a pacific character, those visits benefited the PLA, allowing them 
to identify the conditions for a future utilization of Latin American ports 
for maintenance, replenishment and other purposes (Evans 2012, 32. Our 
translation).
33 Available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-17/china-s-easy-money-
flows-abroad-as-credit-squeeze-hurts-at-home. Accessed June 8 2018.
34 From 2013 on, China also began to donate military equipment to Ecuador, Bolivia, Guyana, 
Colombia and Peru.
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 Besides the Asian giant, other Asian countries have been trying to enter 
in the subcontinent’s defense market. Since 2012, South Korea had been rising 
as a new actor in the South American trade of defense equipment35. Colom-
bia and Peru have been the first buyers of Seoul. The South Korean strategy is 
partly similar to China’s and other countries’ strategy: donation of secondhand 
equipment and posterior sale of new ones36. Accordingly, the Koreans have do-
nated to the Peruvian and Colombian navies old corvettes; to the former, of 
the Pohang class, and, to the latter, of the Donghae one. As an outcome of the 
negotiations, the Koreans also established joint-ventures between the company 
STX and the enterprises COTEMAR (Colombia) and SIMA (Peru) looking for-
ward to the construction, transferring of technology and development of new 
offshore patrol vessel’s models. The Peruvians are constructing 14 patrols, and, 
the Colombians, 16.
 The Korean strategy had already been used in the country’s entrance 
into other defense markets, especially the Asian one, dominated by the U.S., 
Russia and China. From the year 2000 on, the South Korean government do-
nated to the Philippines, Kazakhstan, Bangladesh, Ghana, East Timor and Trin-
idad and Tobago many patrol vessels from the class Chamsuri. These donations 
allowed the establishment of new negotiation processes for the posterior sale of 
other equipment, as advanced training/attack aircrafts KAI T-50, landing ships 
and the purchase of corvettes for the Philippines (which has bought for 100 
dollars a Pohang class corvette), rifles and machine guns manufactured by Dae-
woo to the navy of Bangladesh, and munitions of many types to East Timor’s 
Defence Force.
 South Korea’s main sales in the South American market has been 
twenty KAI KT-1 basic trainer aircrafts for the Peruvian air force – alongside 
technology transferring, the modernization of aircraft assembly facilities and 
the development of a specific flight simulator – and two marine landing ships 
(class Makassar) constructed in the country. Moreover, sixteen anti-ship C-Star 
SSM-700K missiles were sold to the Colombian navy in order to replace the 
Exotec French missiles.
35 Formerly, the country had sold less sophisticated equipment. “Korean Aerospace Industries 
aims to expand its market in South America as well. Since 2006, Latin American countries have 
imported $48.9 million worth of ROK defense gear including trucks, flak vests, ammunition, 
and communication devices”. Available at http://www.sldinfo.com/the-evolution-of-south-
korean-defense-industry-an-emerging-global-player/#_ftn60. Accessed June 8 2018.
36 Available at https://idsa.in/idsacomments/decommissioned-military-hardware_
sbmaharaj_100117. Accessed June 8 2018.
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Conclusion
The aim of this text is to discuss how the political changes occurred 
in South America during the first years of the 21st century influenced the pur-
chase of modern military equipment by some South American countries. Deep 
economic and political changes took place in the subcontinent. Many left-wing 
governments took over the power at the same time as there was occurring an 
expressive increase in the growth rates of the developing countries’ economies. 
The rise in the commodities’ prices enhanced not only welfare programs, but 
also the purchase of defense equipment.
The purchase of defense material is a political decision. The motiva-
tions for a country to acquire defense material derive both from international 
(such as the character of the political regime) and external issues (possibility of 
conflict). In 1968 and 1973, Guyana and Peru, respectively, started to acquire 
Russian armaments as a result of their political approximation with Moscow, 
thus leaving U.S.’ military equipment aside. Even with the end of the Cold War, 
the Peruvians continued granting preference to Russian-manufactured aircraft. 
Other countries began to acquire other equipment that were not supplied by 
the U.S. or that were possibly subjected to vetoes, such as the Igla-S missiles 
bought by Brazil in the mid-1990s.
Venezuela certainly is the most emblematic case. The political positions 
of president Hugo Chávez have put him in collision with Washington. George 
Bush’s and Barack Obama’s administrations have blocked Caracas’ attempts to 
modernize U.S.-manufactured equipment and have established vetoes to the 
sales of other apparatuses using North-American technology, produced by Eu-
ropeans of by Brazil, for instance. The result was the institution, by the Venezu-
elan government, of a policy marked by extensive armaments’ purchase from 
Moscow. Posteriorly, China also became an important supplier, alongside Cuba 
and Vietnam. The Venezuelan government’s decision also had n strong influ-
ence in the defense equipment’s purchase made by Bolivia, which also suffers 
from U.S.’ veto.
The biggest threat to the sale of Russian equipment in the region seems 
to come from China. With an enhancement in the economic and political rela-
tions derived from the Chinese expansion, Beijing began to invest in the sale of 
military equipment through the financing of state banks to many governments. 
Ecuadorians, Bolivians, Venezuelans and Argentinians started to purchase var-
ious types of Chinese equipment, ranging from cannons to advanced training 
aircrafts.
Another important competitor that has been entering into the South 
American market is South Korea. With an already tested selling strategy in oth-
Ricardo Borges Gama Neto
181
er countries (donation of ships and posterior offer of products), the Republic 
of Korea has been attracting South American countries that aim at diversifying 
their suppliers of high-technology equipment, such as aircrafts, ships and mis-
siles.               
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ABSTRACT
The article tries to discuss if the impact of the political changes, which occurred in 
South America from the first decade of the century, influenced the purchase of military 
equipment by some countries of the region. The emergence of new governments, 
with a strong left leaning, occurred concurrently with a clear change in the classic 
pattern of buying defense equipment. European countries and the US have come 
to be preferred, as opposed to Russia and China, as suppliers of arms to the various 
South American armed forces.
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